surai-ce (MPCI), crop hail and fire insurance, Agricultural lenders have a stake in and are forw contracting, hedging, commodity op in a position to influence their borrowers' mantions, rm program participation, and enteragement decisions. Risk management practice prise diversification. Lenders and producers adoption is an area in which lenders might want attitudes toward use of each of these practices to exercise this influence. This study employs must depend on their perceptions regarding logistic statistical models to estimate lenders' (a) the importance ofthe source of riskthe pracinfluence on crop producers' decisions regardtice is used to manage, and (b) the effectiveness ing use of three alternative risk management of the practice in mitigating the associated risk. practices: federal multiple-peril crop insurance, Previous studies haveinvestigated agriculcrop hail and fire insurance, and forward contural producers'perspectives on the importance tracting. Results suggest lenders can exert of different sources of risk as well as the mansignificant influence on these decisions but that agement practices they adopt to reduce those poor communication between lenders and borrisks (Boggess et al.; Patrick). Other studies rowers likely reduces this influence.
Credit financing for both capital purchases of these studies provides a direct comparison of redt financting expeo r both cpital pursesl producers' and lenders' perceptions regarding and annual operating expenditures is essential the importance of different sources of risk or to the operation of most U.S. farms. As a result, the effectiveness of riskmanagementpractices. agricultural lenders a More n a position to have aimportantly, these studies do not directly stake in and to influence agricultural producers investigate the influence of lenders' credit polimanagement decisions. This influence can be cies and recommendations on producers' risk exercised directly through interest rates, credit management decisions. 1 This study examines restrictions, or other direct credit responses, or these issues which may have important implicaindirectly through verbal recommendations or tions for crop producers, their lenders, and for suggestions made in the course of credit counagricultural policy seling.
The remainder of this paper is organized as One area in which agricultural lenders might follows. First, the survey procedure used-to wish to influence their agricultural producerobtain information from agricultural producers borrowers' decisions is risk management. Crop and primary non-real estate agricultural lendproducers, for example, have a wide range of ers in three crop-producing regions of Texas is risk management practices available to them. described. This is followed by profiles of the Among these are federal multiple-peril crop inresponding agricultural producers and lenders. a A number of reasons accounted for some returned surveys not being considered useful. The largest number were excluded because the respondent indicated that he/she was no longer actively involved in a farming operation.
b Commercial banks. c Production Credit Association.
d Farmers' Home Administration.
Next, producers' and lenders' responses recounties, (b) the Texas Blacklands-composed garding (a) the importance of sources of risk, of 12 counties, and (c) the Texas Coastal Bend-(b) the effectiveness of alternative risk mancomposed of 20 counties ( Figure 1 ). Crop proagement practices, and (c) the effect of risk duction in all three study regions is diverse. Primanagement practice adoption on lenders' views mary crops in the High Plains are: wheat-3.9 of loan requests are summarized. Results of lomillion acres, cotton-1.9 million acres, grain gistic statistical models are presented relating sorghum-0.8 million acres, and corn-0.4 milproducer use of three risk management praclion acres. Primary crops produced in the Blacktices-MPCI, crop hail and fire insurance, and lands are: wheat-348 thousand acres, grain forward contracting-to lenders' credit policies sorghum-307 thousand acres, corn-182 thouand producers' perceptions oflenders' attitudes, sand acres, and cotton-155 thousand acres. as well as producer and farm firm attributes.
Coastal Bend crops include: grain sorghumFinally, the study results are summarized and 562 thousand acres, corn-329 thousand acres, implications for agricultural producers, lendcotton-241 thousand acres, and rice-186 thouers, and agricultural policy are suggested.
sand acres. The producer and lender surveys were con-SURVEY REGIONS AND PROCEDURE ducted during July through September 1987. The survey regions selected for this study
The mailing list for agricultural producers was are (a) the Texas High Plains-composed of 45 developed from a Crop Reporting Service ran- 25%  21%  24%  $1-$4999  17%  10%  16%  15%  $5000-$9999  12%  7%  16%  12%  $10,000-$24,999  23%  25%  19%  23%  $25,000-$49,999  17%  22%  20%  19%  $50,000 and over  6%  10%  8%  7%   Percent equity in farm operation  Less than 20%  11%  6%  12%  10%  20-39%  10%  8%  16%  11%  40-59%  19%  18%  15%  18%  60-79%  18%  27%  18%  20%  80-99%  17%  17%  18%  17%  100%  24%  23%  22%  23% dom sample which was updated by the agriculsideredusefulisbroken out byregionin Table 1 . tural extension agent in each county. 3 Surveys Different survey instruments were used for were mailed to all commercial banks, Producproducers and lenders. This was necessary in tion Credit Associations (PCA's), and Farmers' order to tailor the questions to each group. For Home Administration (FmHA) offices in the example, producers were asked, "How imporstudy regions. Initial mailings were followed by tant is each of the following sources of risk in a postcard reminder 10 days later. Additional terms of its effect on your annual net cash farm copies of cover letters and survey questionincome?" while lenders were asked, "How imnaires were mailed to nonrespondents three portant is each of the following sources of risk in weeks and five weeks after the first mailing.
terms of its effect on the annual net cash farm This survey procedure has been recommended income of your agricultural borrowers?" Differby Dillman to minimize nonresponse bias. The ent survey instruments were also required to number of surveys mailed, returned, and conobtain information about respondent attributes 3The survey responses presented in this paper are a part of a larger risk management survey partially supported by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation through the Federal Extension Service (ES-USDA). Approximately 8 percent of producers in the High Plains region were surveyed, while surveys were mailed to approximately 4 percent of producers in the Blacklands and 2.5 percent of producers in the Coastal Bend. that are different in nature for producers and
The High Plains farms average 1,617 acres; lenders. Although different questionnaires were Blacklands and Coastal Bend farms have less used for the two survey groups, the questionacreage. Gross farm sales are, on average, largnaires were designed so that many questions, est for the Coastal Bend respondents, followed like those above, were mirror images. Through by the Blacklands. The High Plains farms have this approach, comparable information was a slightly lower revenue-producing capacity. obtained from producers and lenders. This Two factors that may have a bearing on the comparability of responses is critical to the riskmanagement strategies aproducer-decision comparative analysis presented following brief maker adopts are the amount ofincomefrom profiles of the two survey groups.
off-farm sources and equity in the farm operation. Twenty-fourpercent ofthe producers PROFILE OF PRODUCER have no nonfarm sources of income; nearly 50 RESPONDENTS percent have off-farm employment income and As indicated in Table 2 , the average age of investment earnings of $10,000 or more. The responding producers is 52 years, with essendistributions of percent equity are similar for tially no difference among regions. More than the three regions. Fewer low-equity (equity 85 percent of the respondents are high school less than 40 percent) farms are represented in graduates, while approximately one-third are the Blacklands than in the High Plains and college graduates.
Coastal Bend. Overall, 39 percent of respondents aSources of risk are listed in the order they were presented in the surveys. Values presented here are average ratings across all respondents. The rating scale was from 1 to 7, where a 1 represented "little effect" and a 7 represented "great effect." Numbers in parentheses are rankings for the respondent groups (1 =highest).
reported less than 60 percent equity, 37 percent outstanding and nearly $4 million more of total reported equity between 60 and 99 percent, and agricultural loan volume than lending institu-23 percent reported they have no debt. tions in the Blacklands or the Coastal Bend. The proportion of agricultural loans is largest in the PROFILE OF LENDER High Plains at 39 percent, compared with 35 RESPONDENTS percent in the Blacklands, and 25 percent in the Summary information about the lending inCoastal Bend. Crop loans make up a larger stitutions represented by the responding loan proportion of total agricultural loans in the officers is in Table 34 Forty-eight percent of Coastal Bend than in the Blacklands or High these institutions are independent banks, 13
Plains; "other" agricultural loans account for a percent are affiliates of a multiple-bank comlarger percentage of loan typeintheBlacklands pany, 12 percent are PCA's, and 27 percent are than in the other regions. FmHA offices. Some regional differences are Twenty-seven percent of the responding evident. In the Blacklands, for example, the lending institutions have four or more loan offirelatively smaller percentage of independent cers serving agricultural customers. The lender surveys were addressed to the' lending institutions. All were completed by individuals who identified themselves as agricultural loan officers. It is assumed that these respondents' views reflect those of their lending institutions. (1) aSources of risk are listed in the order they were presented in the surveys. Values presented here are average ratings across all respondents. The rating scale was from 1 to 7, where a 1 represented "little effect" and a 7 represented "great effect." Numbers in parentheses are rankings for the respondent groups (1=highest).
practices producers adopt and lenders absolute magnitudes. The narrow range for the recommend.
lender ratings indicates lenders view all the Producers and lenders were asked to rate the sources of risk with similar importance. importance of several sources of risk. Each source was considered independently, without EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE regard for possible interrelationships. The re-RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES suits of these ratings are presented in Table 4 .
Results of producer and lender ratings con-A scale of 1 to 7 was used, with a rating of 1 cerning the effectiveness of alternative risk indicating the source has "little effect" and a 7 management practices in reducing income unindicating it has "great effect" on net farm certainty resulting from crop yield and price income variability. variability are in Table 5 . These ratings are, in Two aspects of the ratings in Table 4 are of general, much lower than those in Table 4 . They particular interest: (1) the absolute magnitude indicate that producers, particularly, do not of the ratings and (2) the ranking of the sources consider most of these risk management pracof risk and relative rankings between the two tices to be highly effective. Producers rate farm respondent groups. The absolute magnitudes of program participation and enterprise diversifithe ratings are quite high, suggesting both cation substantially higher than the other pracgroups consider all the sources of risk to be tices. These two practices, along with forward important. Between groups, the rankings are contracting, also are rated highly by lenders. similar; however, they do indicate some general Relative rankings of the practices are quite differences of opinion between producers and similar between the two groups. lenders. Crop price variability is rated highest A noteworthy observation about the ratings by both groups. Producers rate yield variability in Table 5 is that risk management practices second, while lenders rate it third after changes which mitigate the effects of both price and in government farm programs, which ranks yield uncertainty-farm program participation third in the producer ratings. A notable feature and enterprise diversification-are rated highof the comparative ratings is that producers est. Next are practices which reduce price risk: rate changes in interest rates and/or credit forward contracting, commodity options, and availability and changing family relationships hedging. Finally, the two insurance options, substantially lower than the other sources of which afford yield risk protection only, are rated risk. Although these factors rank low in the lowest. The rating of price risk as more imporlender ratings, there is no substantial gap in the tant than yield risk (Table 4 ) may partially ex- The results presented thus far indicate that adopt one or more of these risk management the responding lenders believe their agriculpractices which they view favorably, a need for tural producer-borrowers face substantial risk improved communication is indicated. from a number of sources. These responses also suggest that lenders believe a number of risk LOGIT ANALYSIS OF RISK management practices substantially reduce the risk associated with commodity prices and crop A primary study objective is to examine the yields. This leads to the question of how lenders influence of lenders' credit policies and producrespond to producers' use of these risk manageers' perceptions of lenders' attitudes on risk ment practices. The length of the survey did not management practice adoption. Logit statistipermit as much detail on this issue as would cal models (Maddala) are estimated to predict have been preferred. However, a general meas-(a) MPCI, (b) crop hail and fire insurance, and ure of lenders' attitudes and producers' percep-(c) forward contracting decisions based on these tions of those attitudes was obtained.
lender-related factors as well as producer and Responses to a question regarding whether farm firm attributes. In each model, the deproducers' use of each of the risk management pendent variable is binary, taking a value of practices studied would result in lenders "viewzero if the respondent has not used the practice ing their loan request more favorably" are in the past four years and a value of 1 if the presented in Table 6 . In general, the lenders' practice has been used during that time period. responses are favorable and are reasonably, Since omitted observations are not permitted though not perfectly, consistent with the lendin logit analysis, only a subset of the responding ers' effectiveness rankings in Table 5 . Striking producers-those who borrow operating capidifferences, however, occur between the protal and who completed all the relevant survey ducers' and lenders' responses. Government questions-are included in the analysis. Similar farm program participation is the only practice models are not estimated for hedging or comthat a majority of responding producers believe modity options because too few respondents would influence lenders to view a loan request have used these practices to yield reliable remore favorably. No more than 30 percent of suits. Information obtained through the survey producers believe that any of the other pracis also insufficient to estimate models for farm tices would have this effect on lenders' attitudes.
program participation and enterprise diversifiAlthough producers would not be expected cation. to predict with perfect accuracy lenders' atti-
The independent variables included in the 
--------…---… -------Lender-Related Variables -------------------Type of Lendera
Prod. Credit Assoc. Binary (0-1) Takes a value of 1 if the primary source of operating capital is a production credit association. FmHA Binary (0-1) Takes avalue of 1 if the primary source of operating capital is the Farmers' Home Administration. FmHA Guarantee Binary (0-1) Takes a value of 1 if the primary lender requires an FmHA operating loan guarantee.
Lender Policyb
Recommends Practice Binary (0-1) Takes avalue of 1 if lender has ever recommended use of the practice. Discusses Practice Binary (0-1) Takes a value of 1 if lender has ever discussed use of the practice.
Perception of Lender Attitude
Binary (0-1) Takes a value of 1 if the respondent believes that lender would view the loan request more favorably if the practice were used.
Lender-imposed Operating Capital Restrictions
Binary (0-1) Takes a value of 1 if the lender sets a fixed maximum on operating capital credit line.
Continuous Age of responding producer.
Educationc
Some College
Binary (0-1) 1 Includes three classifications for producer responCollege Graduate Binary (0-1) dents who have completed some college, are colPostgraduate Binary (0-1) J lege graduates, or who have some postgraduate education.
----------------------Farm Firm Attributes ----------------------Regiond
Blacklands Binary (0-1) l Takes a value of 1 if respondent's farming operaCoastal Bend Binary (0-1) J tion is in the region indicated.
Off-farm Incomee
$10,000-$24,999 Binary (0-1) [ aDefault classification for this group is commercial bank. bDefault classification is for producers whose lenders neither recommend nor discuss the practice. c Default classification for this group is high school education or less. dDefault region is the High Plains. "Default classification for this group is producers/firms with less than $10,000 of off-farm income in 1986. f Default classification for this group is farm firms with less than $40,000 in gross sales for the year 1987. Default classification for this category is farm firms with less than 20% equity.
hDefault classification for this category is all farms with a primary crop other than those listed.
logit models are described in Table 7 . These most uniformly significant class of variables variables can be classified into three primary across the three models. Type of lender, howcategories:
ever, is not significant at the 0.2 level, with the (1) lender-related variables, 5 exception of the FmHA variable in the forward (2) producer-borrower attributes, and contracting model. This indicates that FmHA (3) farm firm attributes.
borrowers are less likely than other producers There are a number of subclassifications to forward contract. Producers are more likely within these categories. Most of the variables to adopt a practice when lenders recommend are binary classification variables, except rethe practice or discuss it with them. Recomspondent age, percent of acreage owned, and mendation has the stronger effect, except in the percent of acreage irrigated, which are concase of forward contracting where the probabiltinuous. The logit analysis results are presented ity effects are similar. Also, producers who in Table 8 . Results presented for each model believe use of a practice will influence their include: (a) parameter estimates for each lender to view their loan request more favoraindependent variable, (b) the estimated change bly (perception of lender attitude in Table 8 ) in probability for the variable (the probability are more likely to adopt the practice. effect), (c) significance levels for the parameter Lender-imposed operating capital restrictions estimates based on chi-square likelihood ratio increase the probability of MPCI adoption but tests, (d) number of observations, (e) the decrease the probability of crop hail and fire McFadden R 2 statistic for the model, and (f) insurance purchase. A possible explanation for summary measures of the model's predictive this result is that MPCI participation does not capability (i.e., percent of adopters predicted require additional operating capital while crop correctly and percent of nonadopters predicted hail and fire insurance does (i.e., payment for correctly). The McFadden R 2 statistics indicate MPCI coverage is not required until the end of that the explanatory power of the MPCI and the crop year). Operating capital restrictions do crop hail and fire insurance models is quite not have a significant effect on forward congood. The forward contracting model has tracting decisions. somewhat less explanatory power; however, Results for the producer-borrower attribute the McFadden R 2 is comparable to those for variables are mixed across the three models. models of this type reported in a number of Producer age is not significant at the 0.2 level in other studies using survey data (e.g., Capps and any of the models. Additional education is sigKramer; Sonka, et al.) .
nificant in the MPCI model-reducing the likeThe MPCI and crop hail and fire insurance lihood of participation-but is not significant in models are particularly effective in predicting the other models. nonadopters, classifying more than 90 percent Farm firm attributes also have mixed recorrectly. These models are somewhat less efsuits. Blacklands producers are less likely to fective in predicting adopters, correctly classiuse MPCI than are producers in the other two fying 62.5 percent of MPCI adopters and 58.4 regions. Producers in the Coastal Bend are less percent of crop hail and fire insurance purchaslikely to purchase crop hail and fire insurance. ers. The forward contracting model is equally Producers in both the Blacklands and Coastal effective in predicting adopters and nonBend are more likely to forward contract than adopters, classifying approximately threeare producers in the High Plains. Off-farm infourths of each correctly. This difference in come is significant in the forward contracting predictive capability is at least partially inhermodel only, indicating that producers (firms) ent in the models since the data include approxiwith moderate amounts of off-farm income are mately equal numbers of producers who have more likely to forward contract than those with forward contracted, while only 35 percent have either more or less off-farm income. Gross sales, used MPCI and 27 percent have purchased crop a measure of farm size, is a significant determihail and fire insurance.
nant of adoption for all three practices. LikeliThe lender-related variables comprise the hood of adoption generally is greater for larger a Variables are defined in Table 7 . b The estimated change in probability of adopting the practice associated with the variable. These effects were calculated atthe means of all independent variables. Significant at the 20% level based on the chi-squared test statistic. " Significant at the 10% level based on the chi-squared test statistic.
firms. Both the MPCI and crop hail and fire and fire insurance, which are used to manage insurance models indicate that the likelihood of yield risk. adoption decreases as equity increases except Most responding lenders indicate that use of for the highest equity level (80-100 percent), the risk management practices results in lendwhere the probability of adoption is somewhat ers' viewing loan requests more favorably. greater than for firms with 40-79 percent eqProducer perceptions are quite different. Fewer uity. Percent equity is not significant in the than 30 percent of responding producers beforward contracting model.
lieve that adoption of any of the practices other Percent of acreage owned and percent of than government farm program participation acreage irrigated are significant only in the has a favorable influence on lenders' attitudes. crop hail and fire insurance model. In this case,
The logit model results indicate that lenders the probability of purchasing crop hail and fire can substantially increase the probability that insurance increases with ownership but detheir borrowers will adopt MPCI, crop hail and creases modestly as the proportion of irrigated fire insurance, and forward contracting by acreage increases, recommending the practices. Discussing the Producers whose primary source of farm practices with borrowers is somewhat less revenue is cotton are more likely to purchase effective but still significant. Even if neither of MPCI, while rice producers are substantially these actions is taken, borrowers who believe less likely to participate. None of the primary that use of one of these practices will lead their crops is associated with increased crop hail and lender to view their loan request more favorably fire insurance adoption. Rice and livestock or are more likely to adopt the practice. Lenderdairy producers are less likely than others to imposed operating capital restrictions increase forward contract their crops. Two factors that the probability of MPCI adoption but decrease could contribute to this result for livestock and the likelihood of crop hail and fire insurance dairy producers are (1) these producers are purchase. Such operating capital restrictions already partially protected from risk through do not have a significant effect on forward diversification and (2) they may feed at least contracting decisions. some of their crops on the farm and therefore are not as concerned about selling price. A Implications for Agricultural Producers majority of Texas rice producers have tradi-A significant number of agricultural productionallymarketed through a cooperative, probaers who participated in the survey are responbly contributing to their low use of forward sive to their lenders' views (as they perceive contracting. them) regarding risk management practice SUMMARY AND IMPLATIONS adoption. Many producers, however, apparently do not correctly interpret their lenders' views. The study results have important implicaThis suggests that producers who are willing to tions for agricultural producers, agricultural consider their lenders' attitudes in formulating lenders, and agricultural policy. This section a risk management program should further summarizes the study results and suggests these investigate their lenders' preferences. implications.
Implications for Agricultural Lenders Summary
A clear implication of this study is that many The survey results indicate that both agricullenders do not communicate effectively with tural producers and agricultural lenders contheir borrowers, at least concerning risk mansider all the sources of risk studied to be imporagement practice adoption. Although most lendtant. Responding lenders in general view risk ers surveyed favor the use of a number of risk management practices including MPCI, crop management practices, most borrowers do not hail and fire insurance, forward contracting, recognize this advocacy. Lenders who would hedging, commodity options, enterprise diverprefer that their borrowers develop risk mansification, and farm program participation as agement programs including one or more of the effective means to reduce risk associated with available practices should discuss such programs crop yield and price variability. Responding with their customers. Straightforward recomcrop producers are much less optimistic regardmendation of some risk management practices ing the effectiveness of these practices. Both may be appropriate for lenders who strongly producers and lenders rate price risk managefavor their use and who are willing to take a ment practices higher than MPCI and crop hail more active posture.
Policy Implications
1980, the federal government has engaged in an effort to increase MPCI participation. This study Two of the risk management practices studsuggests one avenue to achieve this goal might ied-farm programs and MPCI-are direct inbe to work through agricultural lenders, who struments of U.S. farm policy. Results suggest can have a significant influence on producers' that crop producers and agricultural lenders MPCI participation decisions. Educational consider farm program participation to be the programs for agricultural lenders focusing on most effective of the risk management prac-MPCI could be effective if they improve lendtices studied. MPCI, however, is viewed by ers' perceptions of MPCI or influence lenders to both groups as the least effective practice. Since communicate more effectively with their borpassage of the Federal Crop Insurance Act of rowers concerning MPCI participation.
